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COMMENT 
Irving v. Penguin: Historians on Trial 
and the Determination of Truth Under 
English Libel Law 
Dennise Mulvihill* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Irving v. Penguin2 libel judgment, which denounced 
revisionist historian David Irving, was welcomed and heralded 
around the world.  The public could have been deprived of this 
ruling if Irving had originally brought this action in the United 
States, where constitutionally-mandated protections of free speech 
would have likely prevented him from surviving a summary 
judgment motion.  Irving, however, brought suit in England, where 
plaintiffs can easily establish a prima facie case, and the burden of 
proof is on the defendant.  In spite of the pro-plaintiff libel laws 
favoring Irving, the truth prevailed.  Irving was branded a liar, and 
Deborah Lipstadt, the author whom Irving sued for libel, was 
vindicated through English libel law. 
Many critics have denounced English libel law, noting the 
chilling effect of libel judgments on the media and free speech.3  In 
numerous cases, American courts have refused to enforce English 
libel judgments rendered against American defendants on public 
policy grounds.4  The European Court of Human Rights also has 
                                                          
 * Vanderbilt University, B.A., 1998; J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University.  I 
dedicate this comment to my family - my parents, Maryanne and Dennis, for their support 
and love, and to Brian and Mariah for their unwavering confidence in me.  I thank Dan 
Shafer for his editorial assistance and encouragement.  
 2 Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B. Apr. 11, 
2000). 
 3 See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT 
(1997); Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times Actual Malice 
Standard Really Necessary?  A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1169 
(1993); Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, An Opportunity Lost: The United 
Kingdoms Failed Reform of Defamation Law, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 621, 623-36 (1997). 
 4 See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992) 
(holding an English libel judgment could not be recognized, since the court did not have 
adequate safeguards to protect freedom of speech and press, which are required by the 
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criticized English libel law.5  Anthony Julius, Lipstadts solicitor, 
noted that Irving v. Penguin was a sparkling vindication of the 
English libel laws.6  Part I of this Comment will discuss the Irving 
v. Penguin decision and English libel law.  Part II will examine 
Irving v. Penguin under U.S. libel law and will argue that 
protections of free speech in U.S. libel law would have prevented 
Irving from surviving a summary judgment motion had he brought 
suit in the United States.  Part III will compare U.S. and English 
libel law in light of the Irving judgment. 
  I.  IRVING V. PENGUIN 
David Irving brought suit against Penguin Books and Deborah 
Lipstadt for libel in the High Court in London in 1994.  Justice 
Gray found that statements in Lipstadts book were libelous of 
Irving.  The Defendants chose to assert the defense of justification, 
or truth.  Because English libel law places the burden of proof on 
the defendant, Penguin and Lipstadt had to prove that the data and 
evidence available to Irving when he was writing his books could 
not support Irvings historical conclusions, and that Irving 
deliberately made false statements about history.  The Defendants 
won the case by proving the truth of the statements in Denying the 
Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory7 (Denying 
the Holocaust) through the testimony and reports of five World 
War II and Holocaust historians who examined Irvings writings 
and speeches and the evidence used to support Irvings statements. 
 A.  The Origins of the Case 
In 1993, Penguin Books Ltd. published Professor Deborah 
Lipstadts book in which she accused David Irving of manipulating 
historical data and denying the occurrence of the Holocaust.  David 
                                                                                                                                  
First Amendment); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp 1 (D. D.C. 1995) (holding that 
English libel judgment was contrary to public policy and would be denied recognition 
under the principles of comity).  
 5 See, e.g., Miloslavsky v. U.K., 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442 (1995) (holding that a 
UK£1.5 million damage award infringed Defendants rights under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights). 
 6 Anthony Julius & James Libson, Losing was Unthinkable, INDEP. (London), Apr. 
18, 2000, at 11. 
 7  DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST (Penguin Books, 1994). 
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Irving, an English author and self-professed expert on the Third 
Reich, sued Penguin Books and Lipstadt for libel in England.  The 
High Court found for the Defendants, holding that the Defendants 
had substantially justified the truth of Lipstadts statements. 
 1.  The Parties 
In 1993 Deborah Lipstadt, a professor of Modern Jewish and 
Holocaust Studies at Emory University, wrote Denying the 
Holocaust.8  In her book, Lipstadt examined the origins and 
subsequent growth of Holocaust Denial.9  She identified several 
adherents of this revisionist movement (or deniers) and 
examined the basis for their beliefs, their methodology, and the 
manner in which they deploy their arguments.10  Lipstadt argued 
that the deniers represent a clear and present danger since future 
generations must learn from the terrible events of the 1930s and 
1940s.11  She also discussed the work of David Irving, whom she 
considered one of the most dangerous spokespersons for 
Holocaust denial.12 
David Irving has authored over thirty books about World War 
II.13  He also has lectured in Australia, Canada, Europe, and the 
United States and has participated in numerous radio and 
television broadcasts.14  Some scholars have praised Irving for his 
thoroughness of research and eloquence of writing.15  Irving, 
however, has been criticized in the media and in academic circles 
for denying the existence of gas chambers at the Auschwitz  
 
                                                          
 8 See LIPSTADT, supra note 7. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 2.1 (Q.B. 
Apr. 11, 2000). 
 11 See id. 
 12 Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 2.4. 
 13 Id. ¶ 1.4. 
 14 See id. ¶ 1.6. 
 15 See, e.g., Slugging Through the Mud, ECONOMIST (London), Apr. 15, 2000, at 55.  
The article stated, in part, that Donald Cameron Watt, a former professor of international 
history at London University, wrote of the admiration he had formed for Mr. Irvings 
professionalism when collaborating with him on some research many years previously.  
No book of his ever failed to come up with new evidence, Mr. Watt was quoted as 
saying.  John Keegan, a much-respected military historian, also praised Mr. Irvings 
extraordinary ability to describe and analyse Hitlers conduct of military 
operations.  Id. 
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concentration camp and alleging that the Holocaust is a Jewish 
conspiracy.16 
David Irving considers himself an expert on Hitler and Nazi 
leaders.17  A central tenet of Irvings historical writing about the 
Nazi era is that Hitler was not [a] . . . ruthless persecutor of 
Jews.18  Irving has asserted that Hitler lost interest in anti-
Semitism in 1933.  He claimed that Hitler never authorized and 
indeed was ignorant of the persecution and systematic killing of 
the Jews.19  Rather, Irving claimed that Hitler intervened to protect 
the Jews from other Nazis.20 
 2.  The Cause of Action 
After Penguin Books published Denying the Holocaust in 
England, David Irving sued Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt 
for libel.21  He asserted that certain passages in Lipstadts book 
accuse him of being a Nazi apologist and an admirer of Hitler.22  
Irving also alleged that passages indicated that he distorted facts 
and manipulated documents to support his contention that the 
Holocaust did not take place.23 
The High Court ruled against David Irving in a scathing 
judgment, finding that the Defendants had substantially justified 
Lipstadts statements.24  The court stated that the Defendants 
proved that Irving was a racist, an anti-Semite, and a Holocaust 
denier who deliberately misrepresented historical evidence to 
exonerate Hitler.25  Irving is now faced with the cost of the defense 
bill, which is in excess of UK£3 million.26 
                                                          
 16 See, e.g., Frank Rich, Hitlers Spin Artist, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1996, at A15. 
 17 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 1.5. 
 18 Id. ¶ 5.1. 
 19 See id. (maintaining that Hitler lost interest in his former views when he gained 
control in 1933). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. ¶ 1.1. 
 22 Id. ¶ 1.2. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. ¶¶ 13.16514.1. 
 25 See id. ¶ 13.167. 
 26 See Roy Ulrich, Going Broke to Defend Yourself, NATL L.J., June 12, 2000, at 
A21. 
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 B.  English Defamation Law 
Under English defamation law, plaintiffs easily can establish a 
prima facie case of libel.  Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden of proof is on the defendant.  As a result, libel 
plaintiffs around the world seek to take advantage of the plaintiff-
friendly libel laws in England.  The law, however, provides that 
defendants may choose to assert privilege or the defenses of 
justification or fair comment in order to avoid a libel judgment. 
 1.  Establishing a Cause of Action 
In England, the modern tort of defamation remains rooted in 
long-established common law principles that make it easy for 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case.27  As a result, many 
international libel plaintiffs choose to bring suit in England, and 
thereby take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly defamation laws.28  
These cases are tried in England because, under English law, the 
High Court has jurisdiction to hear libel claims arising over any 
work published in England.29 
In order to establish a prima facie case of libel in England, the 
plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant published the allegedly 
defamatory statements; 2) that the statement refers to the plaintiff; 
and, 3) that the words in question have a defamatory meaning.30 
Upon establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff benefits from 
a rebuttable presumption that the defamatory statement is false and 
therefore does not need to introduce evidence to demonstrate the 
statements falsity.31  In England there is a no fault requirement, 
making libel a strict liability tort.32  Therefore, if a statement is 
libelous, the plaintiff can recover damages for reputational harm 
                                                          
 27 See Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the 
European Union, 36 VA. J. INTL L. 933, 939 (1996). 
 28 DAVID HOOPER, REPUTATIONS UNDER FIRE 428 (2000). 
 29 See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 3, at 16 (noting that London is known as the libel 
capital of the world). 
 30 See CATHERINE ELLIOT & FRANCES QUINN, TORT LAW 149-52 (1999) (noting that  
a statement is defamatory if it tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right 
thinking members of society). 
 31 See RODNEY A SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:9 (2d ed. 2000); see also DAVID 
HOOPER, REPUTATIONS UNDER FIRE 4 (2000). 
 32 See R.W.M. DIAS & B.S. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS 160 (1976). 
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without proof of actual damages.33  General damages are presumed 
to result from false publications.34 
 2.  Defenses 
English law recognizes the interests of free speech and free press 
through several defenses to defamation.  For example, defendants 
may assert the defenses of justification or fair comment.  In 
addition, defendants may claim that a particular statement was 
privileged. 
Justification is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.35  
Although a defamatory statement is presumed to be false, a 
defendant may avoid liability by proving that the statement is 
justified or substantially true.36  Section 5 of the Defamation Act of 
1952 does not require defendants to prove that each defamatory 
statement is true.37  Section 5, however, does require that the 
unproven allegations must not materially injure the plaintiffs 
reputation.38  Thus, the unproven statements must not cause any 
additional injury to the plaintiffs reputation.39  Nonetheless, there 
is some risk to asserting the justification defense, since refusing to 
admit that the statement was false or continuing to publish it 
provides grounds for aggravated damages.40 
Defendants may also choose to assert the defense of fair 
comment.  Fair comment protects expression of opinions 
                                                          
 33 See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 27, at 939-40. 
 34 See W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 298 (12th ed. 1984). 
 35 See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶ 21-76 (Brazier et al. eds., 17th ed. 1995). 
 36 See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 3, at 10. 
 37 Defamation Act of 1952, c. 66, § 5 (Eng.). 
Section 5 states:   
In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more 
distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defense of justification shall not fail by 
reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved 
to be true do not materially injure the plaintiffs reputation having regard to the 
truth of the remaining charges. 
Id. 
 38 See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 3, at 10. 
 39 See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORT, supra note 35, ¶ 21-80. 
 40 See Sutcliffe v. Pressdram Ltd. 1 All E.R. 269, 276-77 (1990).  The plaintiff may 
request aggravated damages, which asks the jury, or in this case the judge, to take into 
account the need for greater compensation because of the defendants particularly bad 
behavior.  See PETER KAYE, AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS 
650 (1996) (citing Sutcliffe, 1 All E.R. at 269). 
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concerning issues of public concern and criticism of government 
officials.41  To succeed with this defense, the defendant must prove 
that the statement was made without malice and that the facts on 
which the statement is based are substantially true.42  English law 
does not protect factual errors or opinions based on them.43 
English defamation law also provides for two types of 
privileges.  Some statements made in certain circumstances, such 
as during Parliamentary debates or court proceedings, are afforded 
an absolute privilege.44  Defendants may also assert a qualified 
privilege if they can show that they advanced legal, social, or 
moral duties by communicating their statements to those with an 
interest in receiving them.45  For example, a qualified privilege 
attaches to a fair and accurate report of a matter of public interest.  
Unlike an absolute privilege, however, a plaintiff can defeat a 
qualified privilege by showing malice.46 
 C.  Analysis of Irving v. Penguin 
Irving brought a libel suit complaining that certain passages in 
Denying the Holocaust were libelous.  Justice Gray determined 
that Irving established a prima facie case of libel and set forth the 
defamatory meaning of the offending statements from Denying the 
Holocaust.  The Defendants chose to assert the defense of 
justification by proving that the statements about Irving were true.  
To prove justification, the Defendants used the testimony of five 
distinguished historians who had examined Irvings historical 
career, publications, and speeches.  After hearing the Defendants 
evidence and Irvings rebuttal, Justice Gray determined that the 
Defendants had proven the truth of most of the statements in 
Denying the Holocaust and thus had successfully asserted the 
defense of justification. 
                                                          
 41 KAYE, supra note 40, at 640-41. 
 42 See id. at 642. 
 43 See HOOPER, supra note 28, at 20. 
 44 See id. at 21. 
 45 See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORT, supra note 35, ¶ 21-106; see also HOOPER, 
supra note 28, at 22. 
 46 See HOOPER, supra note 28, at 22-23. 
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 1.  The Libel Claim 
When Penguin Books published Lipstadts book in England, 
Irving alleged that Denying the Holocaust challenged his integrity 
and ruined his reputation as a historian.  Irving complained that 
numerous passages from Denying the Holocaust were libelous of 
him. Specifically, Irving cited the following: 
Page 14: 
The confluence between anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and 
Holocaust denial forces was exemplified by a world 
anti-Zionist conference scheduled for Sweden in 
November 1992.  Though cancelled at the last minute 
by the Swedish government, scheduled speakers 
included black Muslim leader Louis Farrakhan, 
Faurisson, Irving and Leuchter. Also scheduled to 
participate were representatives of a variety of anti-
Semitic and anti-Israel organisations, including the 
Russian group Pamyat, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, 
and the fundamentalist Islamic organisation Hamas. 
Page 111: 
Nolte contended that Weizmanns official declaration 
at the outbreak of hostilities gave Hitler good reason 
to be convinced of his enemies determination to 
annihilate him much earlier than when the first 
information about Auschwitz came to the knowledge 
of the world. [. . .] When Nolte was criticized on this 
point in light of prewar Nazi persecution of Jews, he 
said that he was only quoting David Irving, the right-
wing writer of historical works. How quoting Irving 
justified using such a historically invalid point 
remains unexplained [. . .] As we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, Irving [. . .] has become a 
Holocaust denier. 
These works demonstrate how deniers misstate, 
misquote, falsify statistics and falsely attribute 
conclusions to reliable sources.  They rely on books 
that directly contradict their arguments, quoting in a 
manner that completely distorts the authors 
objectives.  Deniers count on the fact that the vast 
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majority of readers will not have access to the 
documentation or make the effort to determine how 
they have falsified or misconstrued information. 
Page 161: 
At the second trial Christie and Faurisson were joined 
by David Irving, who flew to Toronto in January 
1988 to assist in the preparation of Zundels second 
defense and to testify on his behalf. Scholars have 
described Irving as a Hitler partisan wearing 
blinkers and have accused him of distorting 
evidence and manipulating documents to serve his 
own purposes. He is best known for his thesis that 
Hitler did not know about the Final Solution, an idea 
that scholars have dismissed. The prominent British 
historian Hugh Trevor-Roper depicted Irving as a 
man who seizes on a small and dubious particle of 
evidence using it to dismiss far-more substantial 
evidence that may not support his thesis. His work 
has been described as closer to theology or 
mythology than to history, and he has been accused 
of skewing documents and misrepresenting data in 
order to reach historically untenable conclusions, 
particularly those that exonerate Hitler. An ardent 
admirer of the Nazi leader, Irving placed a self-
portrait of Hitler over his desk, described his visit to 
Hitlers mountaintop retreat as a spiritual experience, 
and declared that Hitler repeatedly reached out to 
help the Jews. In 1981 Irving, a self-described 
moderate fascist, established his own right-wing 
political party, founded on his belief that he was 
meant to be a future leader of Britain. He is an ultra-
nationalist who believes that Britain has been on a 
steady path of decline accelerated by its decision to 
launch a war against Nazi Germany. He has 
advocated that Rudolf Hess should have received the 
Nobel Prize for his efforts to try to stop war between 
Britain and Germany. On some level Irving seems to 
conceive himself as carrying on Hitlers legacy. 
[. . .] Prior to participating in Zundels trial, Irving 
had appeared at IHR conferences [. . .] but he had 
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never denied the annihilation of the Jews. That 
changed in 1988 as a result of the events in Toronto. 
Both Irving and Faurisson advocated inviting an 
American prison warden who had performed gas 
executions to testify in Zundels defense, arguing that 
this would be the best tactic for proving that the gas 
chambers were a fraud and too primitive to operate 
safely. They solicited help from Bill Armontrout, 
warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary, who 
agreed to testify and suggested they also contact Fred 
A. Leuchter, an engineer residing in Boston who 
specialized in constructing and installing execution 
apparatus. Irving and Faurisson immediately flew off 
to meet Leuchter. Irving, who had long hovered on 
the edge of Holocaust denial, believed that Leuchters 
testimony could provide the documentation he needed 
to prove the Holocaust a myth. According to 
Faurisson, when he first met Leuchter, the Bostonian 
accepted the standard notion of the Holocaust. 
After spending two days with him, Faurisson declared 
that Leuchter was convinced that it was chemically 
and physically impossible for the Germans to have 
conducted gassings. Having agreed to serve as an 
expert witness for the defense, Leuchter then went to 
Toronto to meet with Zundel and Christie and to 
examine the materials they had gathered for the trial. 
Page 179: 
David Irving, who during the Zundel trial declared 
himself converted by Leuchters work to Holocaust 
denial and to the idea that the gas chambers were a 
myth, described himself as conducting a one man 
intifada against the official history of the Holocaust. 
In his forward to his publication of the Leuchter 
Report, Irving wrote that there was no doubt as to 
Leuchters integrity and scrupulous methods. He 
made no mention of Leuchters lack of technical 
expertise or of the many holes that had been poked in 
his findings. Most important, Irving wrote, Nobody 
likes to be swindled, still less where considerable 
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sums of money are involved. Irving identified Israel 
as the swindler, claiming that West Germany had 
given it more than ninety billion deutsche marks in 
voluntary reparations, essentially in atonement for 
the gas chambers of Auschwitz. According to 
Irving the problem was that the latter was a myth that 
would not die easily. He subsequently set off to 
promulgate Holocaust denial notions in various 
countries. Fined for doing so in Germany, in his 
courtroom appeal against the fine he called on the 
court to fight a battle for the German people and put 
an end to the blood lie of the Holocaust which has 
been told against this country for fifty years. He 
dismissed the memorial to the dead at Auschwitz as a 
tourist attraction. He traced the origins of the myth 
to an ingenious plan of the British Psychological 
Warfare Executive, which decided in 1942 to spread 
the propaganda story that Germans were using gas 
chambers to kill millions of Jews and other 
undesirables. 
Branding Irving and Leuchter Hitlers heirs, the 
British House of Commons denounced the former as 
a Nazi propagandist and long time Hitler apologist 
and the latters report as a fascist publication. One 
might have assumed that would have marked the end 
of Irvings reputation in England, but it did not. 
Condemned in the Times of London in 1989 as a 
man for whom Hitler is something of a hero and 
almost everything of an innocent and for whom 
Auschwitz is a Jewish deception, Irving may have 
had his reputation revived in 1992 by the London 
Sunday Times. The paper hired Irving to translate the 
Goebbels diaries, which had been discovered in a 
Russian archive and, it was assumed, would shed 
light on the conduct of the Final Solution. The paper 
paid Irving a significant sum plus a percentage of the 
syndication fees. 
The Russian archives granted Irving permission to 
copy two microfiche plates, each of which held about 
forty-five pages of the diaries. Irving immediately 
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violated his agreement, took many plates, transported 
them abroad, and had them copied without archival 
permission. There is serious concern in archival 
circles that he may have significantly damaged the 
plates when he did so, rendering them of limited use 
to subsequent researchers. 
Irving believes Jews are very foolish not to abandon 
the gas chamber theory while they still have time. 
He foresees [a] new wave of anti-semitism [sic] 
due to Jews exploitation of the Holocaust myth, 
C.C. Aronsfeld, Holocaust revisionists are Busy in 
Britain, Midstream, Jan. 1993, p.29. 
Journalists and scholars alike were shocked that the 
Times chose such a discredited figure to do this work. 
Showered with criticism, the editor of the Sunday 
Times, Andrew Neil, denounced Irvings view as 
reprehensible but defended engaging Irving 
because he was only being used as a transcribing 
technician. Peter Pulzer, a professor of politics at 
Oxford and an expert on the Third Reich, observed 
that it was ludicrous for Neil to refer to Irving as a 
mere technician, arguing that when you hired 
someone to edit a set of documents others had not 
seen you took on the whole man. 
However the matter is ultimately resolved, the 
Sunday Times had rescued Irvings reputation from 
the ignominy to which it had been consigned by the 
House of Commons. In the interest of a journalistic 
scoop, this British paper was willing to throw its task 
as a gatekeeper of the truth and of journalistic ethics 
to the winds. By resuscitating Irvings reputation, it 
also gave new life to the Leuchter Report. 
Page 181: 
A similar attitude is evident in the media reviews of 
David Irvings books: Most rarely address his 
neofascist or denial connections. 
Irving is one of the most dangerous spokespersons for 
Holocaust denial. Familiar with historical evidence, 
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he bends it until it conforms with his ideological 
leanings and political agenda. A man who is 
convinced that Britains great decline was accelerated 
by its decision to go to war with Germany, he is mist 
[sic] facile at taking accurate information and shaping 
it to confirm his conclusions. A review of his recent 
book, Churchills War, which appeared in New York 
Review of Books, accurately analyzed his practice of 
applying a double standard of evidence. He demands 
absolute documentary proof when it comes to 
proving the Germans guilty, but he relies on highly 
circumstantial evidence to condemn the Allies. This 
is an accurate description not only of Irvings tactics, 
but of those of deniers in general. 
Page 213: 
As we have seen above, Nolte, echoing David Irving, 
argues that the Nazi internment of Jews was 
justified because of Chaim Weizmanns September 
1939 declaration that the Jews of the world would 
fight Nazism. 
Page 221: 
Another legal maneuver has been adopted by a 
growing number of countries. They have barred entry 
rights to known deniers.  David Irving, for example, 
has been barred from Germany, Austria, Italy and 
Canada. Australia is apparently also considering 
barring him.47 
At trial, the Defendants did not contest that the quoted 
passages referred to Irving.  Justice Gray stated in his 
judgment that all readers of the book would have understood 
the passages discussing Holocaust deniers generally to refer 
to Irving individually.48  The Defendants also did not contest 
the issue of publication. 
In order to determine how readers would interpret the 
statements about Irving in Denying the Holocaust, both the 
                                                          
 47 See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 2.4 (Q.B. 
Apr. 11, 2000). 
 48 See id. ¶ 2.7. 
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Defendants and the Plaintiff were required to set forth the 
defamatory meaning of the statements.  Justice Gray 
accepted neither the Defendants nor the Plaintiffs proposed 
interpretation.49  Rather, he determined how an ordinary 
reader of Denying the Holocaust would understand the 
statements.50  Justice Gray determined the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the Defendants statements in the 
opinion noting: 
i. that Irving is an apologist for and partisan 
of Hitler, who has resorted to the 
distortion of evidence; the manipulation 
and skewing of documents; the 
misrepresentation of data and the 
application of double standards to the 
evidence, in order to serve his own 
purpose of exonerating Hitler and 
portraying him as sympathetic towards the 
Jews; 
ii. that Irving is one of the most dangerous 
spokespersons for Holocaust denial, who 
has on numerous occasions denied that the 
Nazis embarked upon the deliberate 
planned extermination of Jews and has 
alleged that it is a Jewish deception that 
gas chambers were used by the Nazis at 
Auschwitz as a means of carrying out such 
extermination; 
iii. that Irving, in denying that the Holocaust 
happened, has misstated evidence; 
misquoted sources; falsified statistics; 
misconstrued information and bent 
historical evidence so that it conforms to 
his neo-fascist political agenda and 
ideological beliefs; 
iv. that Irving has allied himself with 
representatives of a variety of extremist 
and anti-Semitic groups and individuals 
                                                          
 49 See id. ¶¶ 2.13-.14. 
 50 See id. 
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and on one occasion agreed to participate 
in a conference at which representatives of 
terrorist organizations were due to speak; 
v. that Irving, in breach of an agreement 
which he had made and without 
permission, removed and transported 
abroad certain microfiches of Goebbels 
diaries, thereby exposing them to a real 
risk of damage; 
vi. that Irving is discredited as an historian.51 
 2.  Defendants Assertion of Justification  
Lipstadt and Penguin Books chose to assert the defense of 
justification.52  In proving justification, the Defendants had to 
establish that all of the statements that Irving complained of were 
substantially true in their ordinary and natural sense.53  The 
Defense had to establish not only that Irvings work was riddled 
with errors, but also that he deliberately misstated facts and 
distorted historical evidence to advance his political and 
ideological views.54  As a result, the defendants had the difficult 
task of proving allegations about Irvings state of mind, as early as 
30 years ago, at the time he was writing his books. 
The Defendants relied heavily on the evidence of five 
distinguished academic historians: Richard Evans, Professor of 
Modern History at the University of Cambridge; Robert Jan van 
Pelt, Professor of Architecture at the University of Waterloo; 
Christopher Browning, Professor of History at Pacific Lutheran 
University; Dr. Peter Longerich, Reader in the Department of 
German at the University of London; and Hajo Funke, Professor of 
Political Science at the Free University of Berlin.55  These 
witnesses examined all of Irvings publications, the evidence he 
used to support his conclusions, and the available evidence that  
                                                          
 51 Id. ¶ 2.15. 
 52 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 1.2. 
 53 See id. ¶ 4.2. 
 54 See id. ¶ 13.138. 
 55 See id. ¶ 4.17. 
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Irving chose not to use.56  Together their expert reports totaled over 
2,000 pages.57 
 3.  The Courts Analysis 
In his decision, Justice Gray thoroughly examined all of the 
historical evidence provided by the Defendants.  At the beginning 
of the judgment and again before the conclusion, the Judge 
emphasized that his function was to decide the question of Irvings 
treatment of evidence, not to make findings as to what happened 
during the Nazi regime.58  In a neutral tone, he enumerated all of 
the Defendants evidence and arguments and Irvings response to 
each item.  In his conclusion, Justice Gray stated which arguments 
prevailed with respect to each claim.59 
The opinion addressed several major areas of debate: Irvings 
historiography, the systematic killing of the Jews outside of 
Auschwitz, the gas chambers of Auschwitz, the bombing of 
Dresden, Irvings research trip to the Russian archives, and 
Irvings anti-Semitism and right-wing associations.60  The 
Defendants examined Irvings writings and speeches on these 
topics to demonstrate that the evidence did not support his 
historical conclusions and that his Holocaust denial was motivated 
by his political and ideological beliefs.61  Ultimately, the Judge 
concluded that the Defendants had substantially justified their 
statements.62 
a. Irvings Historiography 
The Defendants criticized Irvings untenable conclusions about 
several moments in history.  The major criticisms were of Irvings 
contention that Hitler bore no responsibility for Kristallnacht and 
his failure to indicate to his readers when he was speculating rather 
than stating facts. The Defendants also challenged Irvings 
                                                          
 56 See id. ¶¶ 5.1-.12. 
 57 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 4.17. 
 58 See id. ¶¶ 1.3, 13.3. 
 59 See id. ¶¶ 13.1-.162. 
 60 See id. ¶¶ V, VI, VII, IX, X, XI, XII. 
 61 See id. ¶ 5.3. 
 62 See id. ¶ 13.167. 
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interpretation and translation of several Nazi documents that 
downplayed Hitlers role in the extermination of the Jews.63 
The Defendants hired Professor Richard Evans, author of 
numerous books about Germany, to write a report about Irvings 
historiography, his denial of the Holocaust, and his exculpation of 
Hitler.64  Professor Evans lengthy report included numerous 
examples of Irvings portrayal of Hitler, a portrayal which Evans 
claimed was entirely at odds with the available evidence.65  He 
cited many instances in which Irving allegedly distorted the 
historical record by suppressing evidence and using unreliable 
sources in order to ultimately arrive at irrational conclusions about 
events and documents.66  Professor Evans also criticized passages 
in which Irving wrote about Hitler in inappropriately flattering 
terms.67 
Irving countered each of Professor Evans historiographical 
criticisms by supporting his use, or interpretation, of a particular 
document and by challenging the authenticity of documents put 
forth by the Defendants.68  He denied that he falsified history to 
portray Hitler in a more favorable light and argued that he had 
every right to praise Hitler.69  Irving stated that he frequently 
included material in his books which discredited Hitler and other 
Nazi leaders.70  He also claimed that he always indicated in a 
footnote where the document could be found and often quoted the 
document in the original German, behavior that he claimed was 
inconsistent with the charge of being a historian who wishes to 
mislead his readers.71 
Justice Gray found that the Defendants assertion that Irving had 
seriously misrepresented Hitlers views on the Jewish question was 
justified.72  Justice Gray found that Irving deliberately 
misrepresented Hitlers views by mistranslating or omitting 
                                                          
 63 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 5.1-.249. 
 64 See id. ¶ 4.17. 
 65 See id. ¶ 5.5. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id.  For example, in Irvings book, Hitlers War, he described Hitler as a 
friend of the arts, benefactor of the impoverished, defender of the innocent, persecutor of 
the delinquent.  Id. 
 68 See id. ¶ 5.9. 
 69 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 5.10. 
 70 See id. ¶ 5.11. 
 71 See id. ¶ 5.12. 
 72 See id. ¶ 13.31. 
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documents or parts of documents and that this misrepresentation 
was deliberate.73  Finally, Justice Gray stated that the picture of 
Hitler that Irving provided readers conflicted with the evidence.74 
b. Hitlers Involvement in the Systematic Killing 
Outside of Auschwitz 
The Defendants criticized Irvings general representation of 
Hitlers attitude toward the Jews and his involvement in the policy 
to exterminate them.75  Irvings view of Hitler may be summarized 
by his statement that Hitler was the best friend the Jews had in the 
Third Reich.76 
To justify the Defendants criticism of Irving, Dr. Peter 
Longerich, a specialist in the Nazi era, gave evidence of Hitlers 
role in the persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime and of 
the systematic character of the Nazi policy for the extermination of 
the Jews.77  Christopher Browning, a Professor of History at 
Pacific Lutheran University, presented evidence of the 
implementation of the Final Solution, which involved shooting 
Jews in the East and gassing Jews in camps other than 
Auschwitz.78 
Based on the evidence presented by Dr. Longerich and Professor 
Browning, the Defendants contended that, beginning in December 
1941, Heinrich Himmler embarked on a giant homicidal gassing 
program of Jews throughout Europe at camps specially designed 
for that purpose.79  There is no explicit evidence that Himmler and 
Hitler discussed the extermination.80  The Defendants, however, 
argued that in light of the fact that the program was overseen by 
Himmler, the frequency with which Himmler and Hitler met, and 
the evidence of Hitlers thoughts and public statements about Jews, 
                                                          
 73 See id. ¶¶ 13.51, 13.140. 
 74 See id. ¶ 13.141. 
 75 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 6.1. 
 76 Id. ¶ 6.9.  During the course of the trial, Irving conceded that Hitler must have 
known about the gassing after 1943, that he knew and approved of the program of 
shooting Jews, and that the Reinhardt camps at Chelmo, Treblinka, and Sobibor were 
Nazi killing centers where hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed.  See id. ¶ 13.152. 
 77 See id. ¶ 4.17. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. ¶¶ 6.73-.77. 
 80 See id. ¶¶ 6.23-.38. 
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it is inconceivable that Hitler was unaware of, or did not authorize, 
the mass extermination of Jews by gassing.81 
In response, Irving maintained that Hitler lost interest in anti-
Semitism after he came to power, and only espoused anti-Semitic 
views for political reasons.82  He also wrote that Hitler did not 
know, or approve of, the policy of mass shooting and gassing of 
Jews in certain parts of Europe.83  Irving maintained that Hitler 
favored solving the Jewish Problem by means of deportation 
rather than extermination.84 
Justice Gray accepted the testimony of Professor Browning and 
Dr. Longerich.  He concluded the evidence disclosed substantial, if 
not wholly irrefutable, proof that Hitler was not only aware of the 
gassing at the Reinhard camps, but also was consulted on, and 
approved of, the extermination.85  The Judge found that if Hitler 
knew, and approved of, extermination by shooting, it was 
reasonable to assume that he approved of extermination by other 
means.86  Justice Gray found it unreasonable to assume that 
Himmler could, or would have, concealed from Hitler an 
extermination program of such magnitude.87 
c. Auschwitz 
The Defendants challenged Irvings view that no Jews died in 
gas chambers at Auschwitz, a position adopted by Irving after 
reading the Leuchter Report.88  The Defendants introduced 
evidence that indicated Auschwitz was an extermination camp 
where approximately one million Jews were put to death in gas 
chambers between 1941 and 1944.89  The court had to decide 
                                                          
 81 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 6.1, 6.38 
 82 See id. ¶ 6.8. 
 83 See id. ¶ 6.13. 
 84 See id. ¶ 6.9. 
 85 See id. ¶ 13.67. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.67. 
 88 See id. ¶ 7.9 (noting that Mr. Fred Leuchter was described by Irving as a 
professional consultant who routinely advised penitentiaries on electric chair and gas-
chamber execution procedures).  Leuchters report, entitled An Engineering Report on 
the Alleged Execution Gas Chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek Poland, 
concluded that no gas chambers operated at Auschwitz.  Irving regarded that report as an 
important historical document and adopted its major conclusions.  Id. 
 89 See id. ¶ 7.6. 
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whether the evidence could possibly support Irvings contention 
that Auschwitz was one of the many labor camps established by 
the Nazis and not an extermination camp.90 
The Defendants used the testimony of Professor Robert Jan van 
Pelt, who has studied and written extensively on Auschwitz.91  The 
Defendants claimed that the totality of the evidence, including 
camp blueprints, eyewitness accounts, documents relating to the 
capacity of the crematoria, and the amount of cyanide gas 
delivered to the camp, amounted to convincing proof of the mass 
extermination of the Jews by gas.92 
During the course of the trial, Irving modified his opinion and 
conceded that there had been one gas chamber at Auschwitz, but 
claimed it was used solely to fumigate or delouse clothing.93  He 
also accepted that Jews were gassed at some scale at the camp.94  
Irving, however, firmly denied the claim advanced by Professor 
van Pelt, that 500,000 Jews died in a certain morgue at 
Auschwitz.95 
In asserting that there were no homicidal gas chambers, Irving 
relied on the fact that there was no reference to the commissioning, 
construction, or operation of crematoria for genocidal purposes.96  
Irving challenged the eyewitness evidence, claiming that the 
inmates testimonies were influenced by stories that they had heard 
after the war.97  He also claimed that the Nazi testimony was 
unreliable because it was given at post-war trials by prisoners who 
wished to ingratiate themselves with their captors.98  Further, 
Irving maintained that the roof of Morgue 1 at Crematorium 2 
showed no sign of the wire-mesh columns through which gas was 
introduced into the chamber.99  He also relied on the fact that daily 
reports sent from Auschwitz to Berlin contained no mention of 
inmates being gassed, although they did catalogue lists of inmates 
                                                          
 90 See id. ¶¶ 7.6, 7.8. 
 91 See id. ¶ 4.17. 
 92 See id. ¶ 7.75. 
 93 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 7.89.  For this proposition, Irving relied on the 
Leuchter Report.  See id. 
 94 See id. ¶ 7.11. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. ¶¶ 7.102-.105. 
 97 See id. ¶ 7.110. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 7.91.  Van Pelt contends that the gas chamber was 
located in Morgue 1 of Crematoria 2.  See id. ¶¶ 7.60-.62. 
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deaths from natural causes, hangings, and shootings.100  In 
addition, he noted that the amount of fuel, reportedly delivered to 
Auschwitz for the crematoria, was insufficient to sustain the 
number of bodies the Defendants had claimed were cremated.101 
During Irvings cross examination of Professor van Pelt, van 
Pelt testified that he relied exclusively on eyewitness accounts 
recorded immediately after the war so that cross pollination of 
survivors stories was not likely to have occurred.102  Additionally, 
while Defendants admitted that not all eyewitness evidence was 
reliable, the convergence or similarity of the accounts, along 
with documentation of the accounts, tended to prove the 
eyewitnesses validity.103  Furthermore, van Pelt stated that less 
fuel could be used in a crematorium if several bodies were burned 
simultaneously.104  He testified that the morgue was not originally 
built as a gas chamber, but was later redesigned to make it easier 
for gassings to take place.105  Van Pelt finally concluded that the 
roofs of the crematoria were destroyed, rendering it impossible to 
determine whether there were once holes into which the pellets 
containing cyanide could be poured.106 
Justice Gray held that no fair-minded historian could doubt the 
existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz and their use to 
exterminate hundreds of thousands of Jews.107  Although he stated 
that Irving made valuable criticisms about individual pieces of the 
Defendants evidence, the totality of evidence led to the conclusion 
that there were in fact homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz.108  
Justice Gray found that an objective historian would not consider 
the apparent absence of holes on the morgue roof to be a sufficient 
reason to discount the cumulative effect of the remaining 
evidence.109 
                                                          
 100 See id. ¶ 7.103. 
 101 See id. ¶ 7.100. 
 102 See id. ¶ 7.34. 
 103 See id. ¶ 7.75. 
 104 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 7.125. 
 105 See id. ¶ 7.121. 
 106 See id. ¶ 7.120. 
 107 See id. ¶ 13.91. 
 108 See id. ¶ 13.83. 
 109 See id. 
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d. The Goebbels Diary 
In 1992, Irving went to Moscow to examine, and offer to 
purchase, glass microfiche plates of Josef Goebbels diary.110  The 
issue before the court was whether Irving broke an agreement with 
the Moscow archive in connection with his examination of 
Goebbels diary.111  The court also addressed whether Irving 
endangered certain plates when he removed them from the 
archive.112 
The Defendants alleged that Irving broke an agreement with the 
Moscow archive by removing three glass plates, including the one 
generally considered to be the most historically important, without 
permission.113  The Defendants suggested that, by removing the 
plates,  Irving risked damaging the fragile historical documents.114  
The Defendants relied on Irvings diary entries to illustrate the 
breach.115  They argued that a historian should seek permission 
before removing documents from an archive, and by failing to get 
permission, Irving breached an agreement.116  The Defendants 
claimed that Irving risked damage to the plates by removing them, 
leaving them in a hiding place on the ground for an afternoon, and 
subjecting them to forensic testing.117 
Irving did not contest that he removed the plates to have them 
copied and tested.118  He claimed, however, that he had no formal 
agreement with the archive and, therefore, could not have breached 
an agreement.119  Irving maintained that he was compelled to 
remove the documents because he feared that the archive would be 
sealed before he could adequately study certain plates.120  Irving 
also asserted that at no time did he endanger the plates since they 
                                                          
 110 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 12.1-.2 (Paul Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), a 
virulent hater of Jews and other non-Arayan groups, was Reichsminister for 
Propaganda and National Enlightenment during the Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945.). 
 111 See id. ¶ 12.3. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. ¶ 12.5. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See id. ¶¶ 12.10-.11. 
 116 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 12.11. 
 117 See id. ¶¶ 12.12-.14. 
 118 See id. ¶ 12.17. 
 119 See id. ¶ 12.16. 
 120 See id. ¶ 12.17. 
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were wrapped in cardboard and plastic throughout the journey.121 
Justice Gray determined that Irving had formed an agreement 
with the head archivist through one conversation they had.122  
Justice Gray, however, found that an implicit agreement not to 
remove the plates could not be inferred from the one negotiation 
since the archives were in a general state of chaos.123  Therefore, 
Irving did not breach an agreement with the archive.124  Justice 
Gray also accepted Irvings assertion that the plates were safe at all 
times.125 
e. The Bombing of Dresden 
The court addressed the question of whether Irvings account of 
the Allied bombing of Dresden in 1945 was supported by the 
evidence.126  In his book, The Destruction of Dresden, and in 
subsequent speeches and writings, Irving has claimed that there 
were between 60,000 and 250,000 fatalities as a result of the 
bombings.127 
The Defendants alleged that Irving knowingly relied on a forged 
document, known as TB47, and other unreliable evidence, such as 
statements by unidentified individuals, to support his claim that 
250,000 died in the bombing of Dresden.128  The Defendants 
submitted evidence of eleven incidents over twenty-three years 
where Irving offered differing numbers of Dresden fatalities.129  
They also presented evidence that in 1963 Irving had previously 
denounced the Dresden document referred to as TB47.130  
Professor Evans testified that due to questions surrounding the 
documents origins, TB47 was clearly a forgery.131 
Irving attempted to justify the validity of various documents and 
other evidence that he had relied on in his assertions about 
                                                          
 121 See id. ¶ 12.19. 
 122 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.131. 
 123 See id. ¶ 13.132. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. ¶ 13.134. 
 126 See id. ¶¶ 11.1-.4. 
 127 See id. ¶ 11.6. 
 128 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 11.9, 11.41, 11.42. 
 129 See id. ¶ 11.6. 
 130 See id. ¶ 11.10. 
 131 See id. ¶ 11.27. 
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Dresden.132  Irving stated that after he had learned that his high 
estimations of the fatalities were false, he failed to make 
corrections in the 1991 edition because the book had already gone 
to print.133 
Justice Gray found that the evidence surrounding TB47 that 
Irving ignored would have been viewed by any dispassionate 
historian as proof that the document was fake and that the actual 
Dresden death toll was approximately 25,000.134  Further, he stated 
that Irvings estimates of 100,000 or more deaths lacked any 
evidential basis.135  The Judge, however, found that the Defendants 
had not justified the assertion that Irving invented evidence in 
order to support his claims.136 
f. Irvings Holocaust Denial, Anti-Semitism, and 
Right Wing Political Associations 
The question before the court was whether Irving was a 
Holocaust denier and whether his denials were justified.137  The 
court also addressed whether Irvings statements about Jews and 
Blacks qualified him as an anti-Semite and a racist.138  In addition, 
the court looked at Irvings political affiliations to determine 
whether he associated with right-wing political organizations.139 
Professor Evans testified on behalf of the defendants that the 
following were typical views held by a Holocaust Denier: 
i. [T]hat Jews were not killed in gas chambers or at least not 
on any significant scale; 
ii. [T]hat the Nazis had no policy and made no systematic 
attempt to exterminate the European Jewry and that such 
deaths as did occur were the consequence of individual 
excess unauthorized at the senior level; 
 
                                                          
 132 See id. ¶ 11.8. 
 133 See id. ¶ 11.40. 
 134 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.123. 
 135 See id. ¶ 13.126. 
 136 See id. ¶ 13.127. 
 137 See id. ¶ 8.15. 
 138 See id. ¶ 9.1. 
 139 See id. ¶ 10.3. 
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iii. [T]hat the number of Jews murdered did not run into the 
millions and that the true death toll was far lower; 
iv. [T]hat the Holocaust is largely or entirely a myth invented 
by Allied propagandists and sustained after the war by 
Jews in order to obtain financial support for the newly-
created state of Israel.140 
Through speeches and writings the Defendants showed that 
Irving held many of the views described above.141  The Defendants 
then used the evidence of their expert historians to show that these 
statements were false.142 
The Defendants relied primarily on Irvings speeches to various 
groups worldwide to illustrate his history of racism and anti-
Semitism.143  Some particularly emotive moments in the trial 
included videos of Irving speaking to a group of skinheads 
chanting sieg heil144 and telling a Canadian audience that more 
people died in the back of Senator Kennedys car at 
Chappaquiddick than died in the gas chambers at Auschwitz.145  
The Defendants also presented quotations by Irving stating that he 
felt queasy seeing black men play cricket for England and calling 
the AIDS epidemic a Final Solution which will wipe out blacks, 
homosexuals, drug addicts, and the sexually promiscuous.146 
Professor Hajo Funke introduced evidence of Irvings 
association with right-wing individuals and pro-Nazi groups in 
Germany.147  Professor Funke testified that Irving has spoken, and 
attended meetings, at many Nazi, right-wing, and anti-Semitic 
organizations.148 
Irving objected to the Defendants use of his speeches, claiming 
that it is customary to use more colorful language in speech than in 
writing.149  He claimed that by making certain statements about 
Jews he was merely explaining to Jews why there is anti-
                                                          
 140 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 8.4. 
 141 See id. ¶¶ 8.6, 8.17, 8.20, 8.29. 
 142 See id. ¶ 8.21-.24. 
 143 See id. ¶ 9.5. 
 144 Seig heil is a Nazi salute. 
 145 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 8.17, viii. 
 146 See id. ¶ 9.6. 
 147 See id. ¶ 10.5. 
 148 See id. ¶¶ 10.8-.25. 
 149 See id. ¶¶ 9.8, 13.94. 
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Semitism.150  By his characterization of Jewish stereotypes, Irving 
claimed that he intended to warn Jews not to encourage negative 
public perception by behaving in certain ways.151  He also stated 
that Jews should not be protected from his criticism.152  In order to 
prove that he was not a racist, Irving said that he had employed 
several members of ethnic minorities.153  Irving argued that the 
Defendants were seeking to prove him guilty by association with 
certain right-wing individuals.154 
Justice Gray found it to be incontrovertible that Irving qualifies 
as a Holocaust denier.155  He based this decision on the fact that 
Irvings denial of several aspects of the Holocaust was contrary to 
the evidence presented.156  The Judge also noted that Irving 
expressed his Holocaust denial in offensive terms, such as 
dismissing the eyewitnesses en masse as having mental problems 
and asking a Holocaust survivor how much money she made from 
her tattoo.157 
The Judge relied on Irvings statements to conclude that he was 
a racist and an anti-Semite.158  He rejected Irvings contention that 
he was merely expressing to Jews why anti-Semitism exists and 
that Jews could be subject to his criticism.159  Justice Gray found 
that Irvings statements could not be read as legitimate criticism of 
Jews because the language Irving used was offensive.160  Finally, 
even though much of the evidence proffered by the Defendants 
was tenuous, Justice Gray found that Irving had associated with 
several right-wing groups and individuals.161 
 4.  Justice Grays Conclusion 
After determining that Irving misrepresented the evidence, 
Justice Gray addressed whether this misrepresentation was 
                                                          
 150 See id. ¶ 9.10. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 9.9. 
 153 See id. ¶ 9.18. 
 154 See id. ¶ 10.28. 
 155 Id. ¶ 13.95. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.101. 
 159 See id. ¶¶ 13.103-.104. 
 160 See id. ¶ 13.103. 
 161 See id. ¶¶ 13.111-.115. 
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deliberate and motivated by a desire to present Hitler in a more 
favorable light.162  The Defendants offered evidence of Irvings 
anti-Semitism and associations with right-wing political groups as 
evidence of his state of mind.163  Alternatively, Irving claimed that 
if he had misrepresented the evidence, it was a result of innocent 
mistakes.164 
Justice Gray stated that a significant feature of the case was that 
Irving . . . appeared to make concessions about major issues.165  
The Judge explained that Irvings readiness to retreat from the 
positions set forth in his writing demonstrated his willingness to 
make assertions about the Nazi era which . . . [were] irreconcilable 
with the available evidence.166  In response to Irvings argument 
that his mistakes were all innocent, Justice Gray wrote that all of 
Irvings errors converge, tending to exonerate Hitler and to reflect 
Irvings partisanship for the Nazi leader.167  In addition, the Judge 
held that the content of his speeches displayed a distinctly pro-Nazi 
and anti-Jewish bias and that he associated with neo-fascists and 
appeared to share many of their racist and anti-Semitic 
prejudices.168  The Judge found that the Defendants showed that 
Irving had a political agenda which disposed him to manipulate the 
historical record so that it appeared to conform to his own political 
beliefs.169 
Justice Gray also found that the Defendants did not justify some 
of the statements made in Lipstadts book.170  The Defendants 
failed to prove that Irving breached an agreement with Russian 
archive officials, or that he endangered microfiche plates of great 
historical significance.171  The Defendants also failed to justify 
their assertion that Irving was scheduled to speak at an anti-Zionist 
conference in Sweden in 1992.172  Relying on Section 5 of the 
Defamation Act of 1952,173 however, the Judge held that the 
                                                          
 162 See id. ¶ 13.136. 
 163 See id. ¶¶ 13.160-.163. 
 164 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.163. 
 165 Id. ¶ 13.152. 
 166 Id. ¶ 13.159. 
 167 See id. ¶ 13.142. 
 168 See id. ¶¶ 13.161-.162. 
 169 See id. ¶ 13.162. 
 170 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.166. 
 171 See id. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See Defamation Act of 1952, c. 66, § 5 (Eng.). 
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proven charges were sufficiently grave to demonstrate that the 
Defendants failure to prove the truth of certain statements did not 
materially affect Irvings reputation.174 
 5.  Damages 
As the losing party in the trial, Irving is responsible for the 
Defendants legal costs,175 which totaled more than UK£3 
million.176  Penguins counsel requested an initial payment of  
UK£500,000, in response to which Irving argued that such a sum 
would preclude him from appealing the decision.177  Finally, on 
May 6, 2000, the court ordered Irving to make an initial payment 
of UK£150,000 within six weeks.178  Subsequently, the law firm 
Irving had hired to represent him on appeal withdrew from the case 
on ideological grounds. 179 
 II.  IRVING v. PENGUIN EXAMINED UNDER AMERICAN LIBEL 
LAW 
If David Irving had brought suit in the United States, he would 
have had to surmount several First Amendment obstacles.  First, 
Irving would be considered a public figure, since as a successful 
writer and lecturer, he enjoys greater access to channels of 
communication.180  As a result, he would have had the burden of 
proving that Deborah Lipstadt published defamatory statements 
                                                          
 174 See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.167. 
 175 See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 3, at 627 (noting that under English rule a 
defeated defendant is responsible for the plaintiffs costs and legal fees). 
 176 See Roy Ulrich, supra note 26, at A21. 
 177 Vikram Dodd, Irving Ordered to Pay £150,000 Interim Costs, THE GUARDIAN 
(Manchester), May 6, 2000, at 10. 
 178 See id. 
 179 See id. 
 180 In Lerman v. Flynt Distribution Co., the Court of Appeals established a four-part 
test to determine who is a limited-purpose public figure. 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir. 
1984).  The court stated that: 
A defendant must show that the plaintiff has: 1) successfully invited public 
attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is 
subject of litigation; 2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy 
related to the subject of the litigation; 3) assumed a position of prominence in 
the public controversy; and 4) maintained regular and continuing access to the 
media. 
Id. 
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with actual malice.181  Actual malice requires a showing of 
knowledge that the statements were false or made in reckless 
disregard of the truth.182  Under these standards, it is unlikely that 
Irving would be able to defeat a defendants motion for summary 
judgment.  
 A.  Applicable Law 
U.S. libel law places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  
Plaintiffs in libel actions may have private or public figure status.  
Public figure plaintiffs must prove that the defendant published 
with actual malice, meaning the defendant had knowledge that the 
statement was false or published with reckless disregard of 
whether the statement was false or not.183  In addition, the plaintiff 
must provide evidence of actual malice to survive a summary 
judgment motion.184 
 1.  Actual Malice 
The Supreme Court of the United States first established a 
federal libel standard in 1964 with the landmark decision of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.185  Prior to New York Times, U.S. libel 
law was almost identical to the English common law of libel.186  
Before 1964, U.S. libel was a tort found only in common law, and 
like current English law, the defendant assumed the burden of 
proving the truth.187 
                                                          
 181 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that in 
defamation cases involving speech of public concern the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving falsity); Curtis Publg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (holding public figures 
must bear the burden of showing by a clear and convincing standard that the defendant 
published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth). 
 182 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 183 Id. at 280. 
 184 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
 185 See id.  The Court established a precedent that prohibits a public official from 
recovering damages from a defamatory falsehood without proof that the Defendant made 
the statement with actual malice, or knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.  Id. at 279-80. 
 186 See Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run 
Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 235, 239 (1994). 
 187 See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 265-69 (stating that Alabama law reflected common 
law and that under Alabama law the defendant has the burden of proving truth). 
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In New York Times, the Supreme Court departed from the 
common law tradition holding that a public official could not 
recover damages for defamation without proving, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant published the defamatory 
statement with actual malice.188  The rationale for this decision 
rested on the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression 
on issues of public concern.189  New York Times also changed the 
evidentiary standard, requiring the plaintiff to show actual malice 
with convincing clarity190 rather than a mere preponderance of 
the evidence, the standard which was previously required of the 
defendant.191  In holding certain libel actions up to First 
Amendment scrutiny, the Court shifted the burden of proof from 
the defendant to the plaintiff.192  In a subsequent decision, Gertz v. 
Robert Welch,193 the Court determined that for both public officials 
and public figures, the showing of actual malice was subject to a 
clear and convincing standard of proof.194 
The Court clarified the New York Times malice standard in a 
later case, St. Amant v. Thompson.195  Actual malice, the Court 
said, requires a showing of either deliberate falsification or 
reckless publication despite the publishers awareness of probable 
falsity.196  The Court stated that the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant published the statement in bad faith, noting that, [t]here 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication.197  In addition, the Court stated that [f]ailure to 
investigate does not itself establish bad faith.198  Under the actual 
malice standard, even a deliberate alteration of the words uttered 
by the plaintiff does not constitute knowledge of falsity unless the 
alteration materially changes the meaning of the speakers 
                                                          
 188 See id. at 279-80.  The Court defined malice as knowledge that the defamatory 
statement was false or reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or not.  Id. 
 189 See id. at 269. 
 190 Id. at 285-86. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. at 279. 
 193  418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 194 See id. at 342.  (noting that in a libel action brought against the publisher of 
magazine article that called the Plaintiff a communist, the Court held that the Defendant 
could not claim constitutional privilege on the basis of discussion of public issue). 
 195 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968). 
 196 Id. at 731 (quoting Curtis Publg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967)). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 733 (citing N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88). 
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words.199  The inquiry into actual malice focuses on the 
defendants belief regarding truthfulness.200 
 2.  Public Figures 
A logical extension of the New York Times rule followed three 
years later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.201  The Supreme 
Court extended the New York Times heightened standard to include 
nonpublic officials or public figures who are intimately involved 
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of 
their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.202 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.203 the Court discussed the 
rationale underlying the distinction between public and private 
figures.204  Public figures have greater access to the channels of 
effective communication and hence have a more realistic 
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals 
normally enjoy.205  The Court divided its discussion of public 
figures into two categories: limited-purpose and all-purpose public 
figures.206 
Examples of all-purpose public figures are rare, and [a]bsent 
clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and 
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his 
life.207  Some examples of all-purpose public figures include 
political candidates,208 entertainers,209 political and social 
activists,210 and well-known writers and critics.211  Most public 
                                                          
 199 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991). 
 200 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) (permitting Plaintiff to probe the 
editorial decision-making process of Defendant and noting that New York Times and its 
progeny require the plaintiff to focus on the defendants subjective state of mind). 
 201 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (Defendant published an article accusing the Plaintiff, the 
athletic director of the University of Georgia, of attempting to fix a game between the 
University of Georgia and the University of Alabama.). 
 202 Id. at 164. 
    203  418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 204 See id. 
 205 Id. at 344. 
 206 See id. at 351. 
 207 See id. at 352. 
 208 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d. Cir. 1969). 
 209 See, e.g., Burnett v. Natl Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1983); Eastwood v. 
Superior Court of L.A. County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983). 
 210 See, e.g., Falwell v. Penthouse Intl, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (1981); Nader v. de 
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figures are limited-purpose public figures who have intentionally 
become embroiled in particular controversies in order to influence 
the resolution of the issues involved.212 
The extent to which the plaintiff has voluntarily thrust himself 
into a public controversy is one of the most important factors in 
determining limited-purpose public figure status.213  In cases 
following Gertz, the Court has given the voluntariness requirement 
even greater importance.214 
 3.  Summary Judgment 
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,215 the Supreme Court held 
that summary judgment must be granted in defamation cases in 
which actual malice was at issue, unless the plaintiffs 
demonstrated that they will be able to present clear and 
convincing evidence of actual malice.216  The Court ruled that a 
trial judge must consider the quantum and quality of proof 
necessary to support liability under New York Times.217 
Defense motions for summary judgment are commonplace in 
suits involving public figure plaintiffs.218  Summary judgment 
motions have proven to be a powerful tool against public figure 
defamation plaintiffs.219  In 1995 and 1996, defendants were  
 
                                                                                                                                  
Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979). 
 211 See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976); Montandon v. Triangle 
Publns, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1975); Maule v. NYM Corp., 76 A.D. 2d 58 (1980); 
Braden v. News World Communications, Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. 1065 (D.C. Super. 1993) 
 212 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
 213 See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 2:31. 
 214 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976) (holding that 
seeking a divorce did not constitute a voluntary act or an assumption of the risk sufficient 
to render the Plaintiff a public figure); Wolston v. Readers Digest Assn, 443 U.S. 157 
(1979) (holding that Plaintiff Wolston had not voluntarily entered the controversy 
surrounding the investigation of Soviet espionage, but had been dragged into the 
controversy unwillingly); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-36 (1979) (holding 
that a professor who voluntarily applied for federal funds was a limited-purpose public 
figure for the purpose of commentary on his publicly-funded research). 
 215 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 216 Id. at 255. 
 217 Id. at 254. 
 218 See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 12:75 
 219 See Press Releases, LDRC Bulletin 1997 No. 3: Report on Summary Judgment, 
available at http://www.ldrc.com/sumjud.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2000). 
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successful in 85.2% of summary judgment motions against public 
figure plaintiffs.220 
 B.  Irving v. Penguin under U.S. Libel Law  
David Irving enjoys considerable access to the media through his 
own books and invitations to speak to organizations around the 
world.  As a result, he would be considered a public figure for 
purposes of U.S. libel law.  If Irving brought suit against Penguin 
Books and Lipstadt in the United States, he would have the burden 
of proving the falsity of Lipstadts statements, and he would be 
required to prove New York Times malice in order to avoid a 
summary judgment in Lipstadts favor. 
 1.  Irving as a Public Figure 
Irving is a successful writer and lecturer.  He enjoys 
significantly greater access to the channels of effective 
communication221 and would probably be considered an all-
purpose public figure in a U.S. defamation action.  The facts 
clearly support this conclusion, since Irving has written over thirty 
books,222 and even before Denying the Holocaust David Irving was 
a familiar name in England.223 
Before the trial, Irving challenged Lipstadts statements in many 
arenas.  Irving disputed Lipstadts allegations at lectures and 
maintained a website where he posted the evidence supporting his 
historical conclusions and propaganda.224  On the website, he 
provided his daily diary entries concerning the events of the trial, 
                                                          
 220 See id. 
 221 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
 222 See generally SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 2:87 (stating that [w]riters, critics and 
columnists may achieve sufficiently pervasive fame and influence to achieve all-purpose 
public figure status). 
 223 See Sarah Lyall, Critic of Holocaust Denier is Cleared in British Libel Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 12, 2000, at A1 (noting that Irving is the author of more than 30 books, 
some of which have been highly admired, notably Hitlers War (1977)); see also 
Vikram Dodd, Irving: Consigned to History as a Racist Liar, THE GUARDIAN 
(Manchester), Apr. 12, 2000, at 1 (reporting that Irving had increased his political 
activity over the past fifteen years, addressing far right audiences in the U.S., Germany, 
Canada and the new world). 
 224 See David Irvings Action Report On-Line, at http://www.fpp.co.uk (last visited 
November 1, 2000). 
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texts of his lectures, and some of his books.  Irving also owns the 
company that published his last book.225 
In Lamkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc.,226 the court held 
that a scientist who had written a book about her search for 
research grants to develop a cure for cancer was an all-purpose 
public figure.227  The court found that the Plaintiffs efforts to 
arouse public indignation and influence the allocation of public 
funds, participation in public debates in health matters, publication 
of her autobiography and other writings and speeches, and efforts 
to seek substantial publicity, among other things, aggregately gave 
her public figure status as a matter of law.228  Similarly, a court 
addressing Irvings public figure status would review Irvings 
publicity-seeking behavior, and most likely find him an all-purpose 
public figure. 
Alternatively, Irving would at least be considered a limited-
purpose public figure for the purpose of this trial, since he 
voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of the debate by 
successfully inviting public attention to his views prior to the 
litigation, and maintaining access to the media.229  Through the 
                                                          
 225 See DAVID IRVING, NUREMBERG, THE LAST BATTLE (1997), which was published 
by Focal Point Publications, Irvings  publishing imprint.  Cf. Loeb v. Globe Newspaper 
Co., 489 F. Supp. 481 (D. Mass. 1980) (holding that Plaintiff, a newspaper owner who 
regularly takes strong public stands on controversial issues . . . (and who) invites 
expression of contrary opinion is a public figure). 
 226 408 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
 227 See id. at 668. 
 228 See id. 
 229 See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
The court stated in part: 
Before a plaintiff can be classified, as a matter of law, as a limited-   
purpose public figure, the defendant must prove that: (1) the plaintiff has  
access to channels of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff  
voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in the public 
controversy; (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or  
outcome of the controversy; (4) the controversy existed prior to the  
publication of the defamatory statement; and, (5) the plaintiff retained  
public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation. 
Id. at 534. 
In Lerman v. Flynt Distribution Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
specifically defined what constitutes a limited-purpose public figure.  See 745 F.2d 123 
(2d Cir. 1984).  The court stated: 
A defendant must show the plaintiff has: (1) successfully invited public  
attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is 
the subject of the litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public 
controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3) assumed a position of 
prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and 
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publication of over thirty books on the subject of World War II and 
numerous lectures and public debates on the subject of the 
Holocaust and Hitlers involvement, Irving has voluntarily thrust 
himself into the Holocaust debate. 
Irving could be considered a public figure merely by reason of 
having published books.230  Courts have consistently held that 
authors may be public figures for the purpose of libel actions due 
to the subject of their works.231  According to this reasoning, Irving 
would be a public figure for the purpose of the libel action because 
Lipstadts statements concerned the subject of his books. 
 2.  Actual Malice 
As a public figure, Irving would have the burden of proving that 
Lipstadts statements are false and that she and Penguin Books 
published those statements with knowledge of their falsity or 
reckless disregard for whether they were false.  Lipstadt would 
probably move for summary judgment on the ground that there 
                                                                                                                                  
continuing access to the media. 
Id. at 136-37.  
In Lerman, the court applied these factors to the Plaintiff, Jackie Collins Lerman, who 
was a prominent author on topics dealing largely with evolving sexual mores in society.  
The court found that Lerman was in fact a public figure with respect to a lawsuit in which 
the Defendant publication had printed her name next to a picture of a nude woman.  
Because Lerman had voluntarily written works catering to the publics interest in sexual 
mores, she was deemed to have purposefully surrendered part of what would otherwise 
have been her protectable privacy rights, at least those related in some way to her 
involvement in writing her books and screenplays.  Id. at 137.  In considering whether 
Lerman had injected herself into a public controversy related to the Defendants 
publication, the court noted that [a] public controversy is any topic upon which 
sizeable segments of society have different, strongly held views.  Id. at 138. 
 230 See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 2:87. 
 231 See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting 
that by adapting Ernest Hemingways books for television, movies, records, and ballet, 
the author had voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy concerning the latter 
years of Hemingways life); see also Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 
1984) (holding that a lawyer who wrote a book about legal self-representation was a 
public figure for purposes limited to the subject of the book); Knudsen v. Kansas Gas & 
Elec. Co., 807 P.2d 71 (Kan. 1991) (holding that a freelance writer whose article was 
published in a newspaper became a public figure by writing the article which was the 
basis of the allegedly defamatory statements); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (holding authors of books were limited-purpose public figures when bringing 
suit against Defendants who made public assertions challenging the accuracy of the 
books); Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating anyone who 
publishes becomes a public figure in the world bounded by the readership of the literature 
to which he has contributed). 
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was no genuine issue of material fact,232 since Irving would be 
unable to prove actual malice.  Irving would be forced to show that 
a reasonable jury could find actual malice with convincing 
clarity.233 
The standard of proof for actual malice is higher than the typical 
civil requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.234  
To prove actual malice, the plaintiff must demonstrate with clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that the 
statements were false or that the defendant subjectively entertained 
doubts as to the truth of the statements.235  In addition, actual 
malice must be pleaded with specificity.236  Thus, public figure 
plaintiffs rarely overcome summary judgment motions.237  One 
court stated that defamation actions should be disposed of at the 
earliest possible stage of the proceedings if the facts as alleged are 
insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for the 
plaintiff.238  Deborah Lipstadt clearly believed what she wrote 
was true.  She gathered her information from many sources, and 
published in good faith.  Lipstadts belief in her statements would 
preclude a finding of actual malice since there must be sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.239 
A determination of whether the defendant published with actual 
malice is an inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant.240  The 
question of Lipstadts state of mind arose in connection with the 
Irving case in London.241  Throughout the trial, Irving claimed that 
                                                          
 232 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 233 See Adler v. Conde Nast Publns Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 234 See World Boxing Council v. Cosell, 715 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 235 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 236 See Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also 
Barger v. Playboy Enters., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Kottle v. 
Northwest Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998) ([W]hen a plaintiff seeks 
damages . . . for conduct which is prima facie protected by the First Amendment, the 
danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of First Amendment 
rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required. (citation 
omitted)). 
 237 See Press Releases, LDRC Bulletin 1997 No. 3: Report on Summary Judgment, 
available at http://www.ldrc.com/sumjud.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2000). 
 238 See Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 239 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (quoting St. 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). 
 240 See id. 
 241 See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 3.8 (Q.B. 
Apr. 11, 2000). 
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Lipstadt was the head of a conspiracy to damage his reputation as a 
historian and silence him,242 an argument he used to support his 
request for aggravated damages.243 
Irving relied on the fact that Lipstadt did not attempt to verify 
the statements that she made, that she continued to publish the 
defamatory statements, and that she was the prime mover in an 
international Jewish conspiracy to prevent the dissemination of his 
books, ensuring that he is banned from as many countries as 
possible.244  Because the conspiracy theory was Irvings only proof 
of Lipstadts state of mind, it is likely that Irving would assert this 
argument as proof of actual malice in a court in the United States.  
The conspiracy assertion would not suffice as proof of actual 
malice since it is a mere assertion of spite or ill will toward 
Irving.245  Though spite or animus toward the plaintiff is 
circumstantial evidence of actual malice, it cannot serve alone as a 
basis for actual malice.246  In addition, Irving would be unable to 
plead this argument with specificity.  In London, he simply 
mentioned Lipstadts association with groups such as the Anti-
Defamation League.247  A U.S. court would likely find that 
Lipstadts personal animosity toward, and disagreement with, 
Irvings views does not create an inference of actual malice. 
 III.  COMPARISON OF THE ENGLISH AND U.S. LIBEL SYSTEMS 
The presumption of falsity is one of the fundamental differences 
between English and U.S. libel law.248  Another difference is the 
lack of fault requirement making libel a strict liability tort in 
England.249  The most critical difference between American and 
English libel law, however, is that English libel law recognizes no  
 
                                                          
 242 See id. ¶ 3.6. 
 243 See id. ¶ 3.8. 
 244 See id. 
 245 See Masson, 501 U.S. at 510. 
 246 See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 
423 S.E. 2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 1992); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989). 
 247 Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 3.8. 
 248 See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 1:9. 
 249 See R.W.M. DIAS & B.S. MARKESINIS, supra note 31, at 160; see also SMOLLA, 
supra note 30, § 1:9. 
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special protection for defamation actions arising from critiques of 
public figures or public officials.250 
One must bear in mind that victories for defendants in libel 
cases, such as Irving, are rare in England.251  By suing for libel in 
England, Irving deprived Lipstadt of scholastic research for four 
years and caused the defense to spend over UK£3 million in expert 
reports, discovery, and legal fees.252  Additionally, the expense of a 
legal defense and the time invested may be enough to discourage 
authors and scholars from expressing criticism of historians such 
as Irving in the English media. 
Two aspects of English libel law, the expense of pursuing or 
defending a claim and the threat of huge damages and costs, have 
created a system that works to the advantage of the wealthy.253  
English libel law has been commonly criticized for awarding 
verdicts that are too high and as uncertain as a lottery.254  In 
addition, a defeated party bears responsibility for litigation costs, 
which in libel cases often approach the size of the verdict itself.255  
Legal aid is unavailable in libel cases, and contingency fee 
arrangements are prohibited in England.256  Consequently, the cost 
of pursuing a libel claim has become prohibitive for all except the 
wealthy or those backed by organizations with significant financial 
resources.257 
Furthermore, the odds against defendants in English libel cases 
are staggering.  In 1990, plaintiffs prevailed in eighty-eight percent  
 
                                                          
 250 See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 1:9. 
 251 See HOOPER, supra note 28, app. at 483-523.  In 1998, plaintiffs won thirty out of 
thirty-two libel cases adjudicated in England.  In 1999, plaintiffs won fourteen out of 
seventeen cases adjudicated.  See id. at 517-23. 
 252 As the losing party, Irving bore the burden of the costs, but it is unlikely that, a 
private citizen, will be able to pay.  See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 2, at 626-27 
(1997).  Journalists have predicted that Irving will declare bankruptcy and Penguin will 
never see a penny of the costs.  See Dodd, supra note 218, at 1 (reporting that Irving 
denied having enough money to cover the cost of his defeat, that he was facing 
bankruptcy, and that the head of Penguin Books UK felt it was unlikely that all costs 
would be recovered). 
 253 See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 626-27. 
 254 KAYE, supra note 40, at 652; see also Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 626-
27. 
 255 See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 627. 
 256 See id.; see also HOOPER, supra note 28, at 459. 
 257 See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 627; see also HOOPER, supra note 28, at 
459. 
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of the cases adjudicated,258 and, in 1999, only two defendants 
prevailed in defamation trials.259 
It is likely that a defendant who publishes the truth will 
nonetheless be silenced by a wealthy, litigious plaintiff in a 
London court.  This pitfall of English libel law was recently 
demonstrated in a series of cases involving a large drug 
manufacturer against an individual scientist.260  The drug 
manufacturer, Upjohn Company (Upjohn), sued Professor Ian 
Oswald, a scientist who had studied sleep deprivation drugs for 
over thirty years, for criticizing Halcion, a drug manufactured by 
Upjohn.  Specifically, Upjohn sued Professor Oswald for alleging 
that Upjohn withheld adverse findings about the sleeping pill.261  
Professor Oswald pleaded justification and lost.262  The legal cost 
of the action were estimated at over UK£2.5 million,263 and Judge 
May awarded Upjohn UK£25,000 in damages.264  The Upjohn 
decision was thoroughly criticized because the English libel laws 
allowed a powerful drug company to silence a critic, and 
essentially through a costly legal battle, suppressed the critics 
right to voice a public concern.265 
                                                          
 258 See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 27, at 943. 
 259 See HOOPER, supra note 28, app. at 523. 
 260 The Upjohn Company and Another v. Oswald; Drucker v. Oswald; The Upjohn 
Company v. British Broadcasting Corporation and Another, Q.B. 27 May 1994, available 
in LEXIS, England and Whales Reported and Unreported Cases [hereinafter Upjohn].  
For analysis of the case see James Penzi, Libel Actions In England, A Game of Truth or 
Dare? Considering the Recent Upjohn Case and the Consequences of Speaking Out, 
10 TEMP. INTL & COMP. L.J. 211 (1996). 
 261 See James Penzi, supra note 260, at 219. 
 262 See id. at 225. 
 263 See Penzi, supra note 261, at 223.  The case was severely criticized because 
Upjohn chose to sue in England, basing jurisdiction on the existence of an Upjohn 
subsidiary in England and the sale of 100 copies of the New York Times.  See id. at 219, 
228 nn. 90, 91; HOOPER, supra note 28, at 192. 
 264 See Hooper, supra note 28, app. at 505.  Concurrent to the trial, the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reexamined Halcion and Upjohns contentions 
regarding the safety of the drug.  The FDA examined the submissions by Upjohn and 
determined that Upjohn had indeed been lying and concealing evidence for twenty years.  
In reviewing the same 1972 test that Dr. Oswald had so vehemently criticized, the FDA 
determined that Upjohns excuse of transcription errors was false and misleading.  The 
FDA also determined that Upjohns senior management knew about the adverse reactions 
to Halcion and deliberately failed to report data from certain studies.  The FDA findings, 
however, released near the end of the libel trial, were not admitted into evidence.  See id. 
at 198-200. 
 265 See Penzi, supra note 261, at 224-25. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of Irving, it is tempting to believe that libel law in 
England provides more freedom to both parties.  Irving was 
permitted to sue Lipstadt, but he ultimately lost.  In the United 
States, plaintiffs who are unable to show actual malice may not 
even make it to trial due to summary judgment.  In contrast, the 
English public rejoiced over the official denunciation of Irving as a 
racist and a liar.266 
The English rule placing the burden on libel defendants can be 
justified on the grounds that publishers and writers like Lipstadt 
should be able to prove the truth of what they write.  On the other 
hand, writers may choose not to publish certain newsworthy, true, 
and critical statements, because they are concerned about whether 
they will be able to prove that the statements are true.  Moreover, 
libel plaintiffs such as Upjohn can bring and win suits contesting 
the publication of true stories because defendants do not always 
have the resources to obtain evidence to prove the truth.  The 
irony is that the law deters critical reporting of precisely those 
whose activities most directly affect legitimate public interest.267  
The Irving case illustrates this irony: after challenging Irvings 
integrity on a matter of public debate, Deborah Lipstadt was only 
able to prove the truth of her statements through 2,000 pages of 
expert reports and over UK£3 million worth of legal expertise 
against a pro se plaintiff. 
 
 
                                                          
 266 See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 223 (reporting that a spokesman for the Reform 
Synagogues of Great Britain called the ruling a victory for 6 million voices that cannot 
speak for themselves). 
 267 Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 623-36. 
